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Abstract
Background: District level health system governance is recognised as an important but challenging element of
health system development in low and middle-income countries. Accountability is a more recent focus in health
system debates. Accountability mechanisms are governance tools that seek to regulate answerability between the
health system and the community (external accountability) and/or between different levels of the health system
(bureaucratic accountability). External accountability has attracted significant attention in recent years, but
bureaucratic accountability mechanisms, and the interactions between the two forms of accountability, have been
relatively neglected. This is an important gap given that webs of accountability relationships exist within every
health system. There is a need to strike a balance between achieving accountability upwards within the health
system (for example through information reporting arrangements) while at the same time allowing for the local
level innovation that could improve quality of care and patient responsiveness.
Methods: Using a descriptive literature review, this paper examines the factors that influence the functioning of
accountability mechanisms and relationships within the district health system, and draws out the implications for
responsiveness to patients and communities. We also seek to understand the practices that might strengthen
accountability in ways that improve responsiveness – of the health system to citizens’ needs and rights, and of
providers to patients.
Results: The review highlights the ways in which bureaucratic accountability mechanisms often constrain the
functioning of external accountability mechanisms. For example, meeting the expectations of relatively powerful
managers further up the system may crowd out efforts to respond to citizens and patients. Organisational cultures
characterized by supervision and management systems focused on compliance to centrally defined outputs and
targets can constrain front line managers and providers from responding to patient and population priorities.
Conclusion: Findings suggest that it is important to limit the potential negative impacts on responsiveness of new
bureaucratic accountability mechanisms, and identify how these or other interventions might leverage the shifts in
organizational culture necessary to encourage innovation and patient-centered care.
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Background
District level health system governance is recognised as
an important but challenging element of health system
development in low and middle-income countries [1].
Accountability is a more recent focus in health system
debates [2]. Accountability mechanisms are governance
tools which seek to regulate answerability between the
health system and / or citizens and between different
levels of the health system [3]. In addition to answer-
ability, accountability has an element of enforcement,
which raises the question of “how to avoid performance
becoming conformance with targets?” (p. 261) [4]. Ideally,
all accountability mechanisms would be designed to
achieve health system goals (such as promoting access to
quality care), but in practice different forms of accoun-
tability may receive higher priority than others and may
have a different focus [5]. An important broad distinction
is between ‘external’ or community accountability mecha-
nisms which may be used by non-state actors to hold
public sector power-holders to account, and ‘internal’ or
bureaucratic mechanisms that are comprised of the insti-
tutional oversights, checks and balances internal to the
public sector [2]. External (or community) accountability
has attracted significant attention in recent years [6], but
internal (or bureaucratic) accountability mechanisms, and
the interactions between the two forms of accountability,
have been relatively neglected.
The Alma-Ata declaration on primary health care [7]
provided a conceptualization of how services at the first
level of care should be organized, delivered and managed
within decentralized health systems [8]. In this con-
ceptualization, decision-space – i.e. decision-making
authority over planning, budgeting, managing and moni-
toring of activities [9]- would be transferred from the
national level to the local level [10]. The declaration also
emphasized the importance of involving citizens in health
care priority setting [8]. It was argued that increased
“decision-space” at lower levels of the health system, to-
gether with citizen involvement in priority setting, might
enhance the responsiveness of the system to the varying
needs of clients and citizens (given resource constraints).
In defining responsiveness in this way, we recognise that
different actors would understand responsiveness diffe-
rently and that it would be possible to provide clinically
appropriate care (following protocol) without being res-
ponsive to community members’ needs and priorities.
However, many would argue for the importance of com-
munity members having an opportunity to voice their
views and concerns, and have these issues responded to,
in addition to clinically appropriate care.
More recently it has been argued that appropriate
decision-space needs to be complemented by governance
approaches that enable and sustain responsiveness, in-
cluding by promoting system learning and accountability
[11]. However, despite its importance, governance and ac-
countability is a neglected area within health policy and
systems research [1]. This is an important gap given the
need, at district level, to strike a balance between: 1)
achieving accountability upwards within the health system
for example through centrally-led budgeting, planning
and reporting arrangements that offer system-wide
guidance and promote system level equity goals [12];
and 2) allowing for the local level innovation that could
improve quality of care and responsiveness to patients
and citizens.
Brinkerhoff and Bossert [13] offer an approach to con-
ceptualizing governance that focuses on the micro level
of relationships among system actors, nested within
wider organizational and system settings. They describe
health governance as being about putting in place effec-
tive rules that “condition the extent to which the various
actors involved fulfill their roles and responsibilities and
interact with each other, to achieve public purpose” (p3).
Other institutional influences over interactions among
actors, and their governance consequences, include the
norms and values that confer responsibilities and rights,
whether formal or informal. Brinkerhoff and Bossert [13]
argue that when these interactions work well, they
ensure accountability to beneficiaries and the broader
public; a policy process that allows negotiation and com-
promise among different actors, and effective policy
implementation.
Using a descriptive literature review, this paper reviews
empirical literature about accountability mechanisms in
the district health system from low and middle-income
countries (LMICs) with a specific focus on public sector
delivery of care. We aim to unpack the factors influencing
how mechanisms work and the link between accoun-
tability mechanisms, and patient and citizen responsive-
ness. We are also interested in the interactions between
mechanisms, including between the different bureaucratic
mechanisms and between bureaucratic and community or
external mechanisms.
Methods
We searched the available literature for empirical papers
on topics related to accountability in health services in
LMICs, as defined by OECD. An initial set of published
and grey literature for review was identified based on
previous experience, through reviewing the reference
lists of three published review articles [6,14,15] and
through retrieving relevant papers. While many of the
papers that were included in this initial literature exa-
mined external accountability mechanisms, there were
few papers that evaluated bureaucratic accountability
mechanisms, and there was also limited evidence regar-
ding how the bureaucratic and external accountability
mechanisms interacted with each other. Additional
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searches of published literature were therefore conducted
in PubMed using combinations of the following key words:
“target”, “target-setting”, “management”, “planning”,
“budget”, “budgeting” and “accountability” together with
“primary health care”, “district”, “developing” and “low
middle income”. The titles and abstracts of papers meeting
these search terms were reviewed and the full versions of
potential papers were read to decide on final inclusion.
The final set of papers was restricted to those that
described or evaluated accountability mechanisms within
the primary health care system (both within facilities and
through the outreach efforts of community health workers
and environmental health officers). Our focus was on
public sector health services – in settings where private
providers are included accountability mechanisms and
structures would need to be different. We excluded non-
English language papers.
Conceptual framework
Our review was guided by the conceptual framework
presented in Figure 1, which is adapted from a health
governance framework proposed by Brinkerhoff and
Bossert [13]. Three sets of actors are depicted within the
framework: (1) politicians, policymakers and bureaucrats
located higher up within the health system hierarchy
(including actors within health ministries, national and
provincial departments of health and district health
management teams); (2) providers operating within pri-
mary health care facilities or outreach workers within
the district health system; and (3) patients and citizens.
The arrows illustrate the relationships between these
sets of actors, and the different nature of the arrows
(in terms of size and transparency) suggests that the
power and influence of the different categories of actors
differs, with the state and providers tending to have
more power, information and expertize than patients
and citizens [13].
The vertical arrows linking providers to the state
illustrate the relationships associated with bureaucratic
accountability mechanisms, which function to promote
answerability within the health system hierarchy. For
example, the state may hold facilities and providers
accountable through monitoring progress towards the
achievement of health care targets, through setting
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Figure 1 Framework of accountability mechanisms in health care.
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budget and expenditure guidelines and through pro-
viding supervision and oversight [13]. Monitoring pro-
gress against targets, for example, is argued to be one
way in which government can provide leadership, gui-
dance and strategic direction for the health sector [16].
These targets are argued to provide benchmarks for
the measurement of progress [16] while ensuring a
minimal level of service delivery within settings and of
equity between settings [17]. Health facility budgets
are frequently determined at the provincial or national
level, and reporting on spending can be used to hold
providers accountable. However, services may be more
responsive to local needs if expenditure categories and
priorities are locally determined [10].
Bureaucratic accountability mechanisms also include a
range of human resource management and supervision
processes [13]. External supervision of facilities and pro-
viders, for example, is argued to be one way of linking
the peripheral facility to the district, which may be im-
portant for maintaining performance and for motivating
staff. Such supervision could include assisting with prob-
lem solving, reviewing facility records and checklists,
and observing clinical practice [18]. Facility in-charges
or managers may also be involved in performance moni-
toring, mentoring and disciplinary action within facilities,
and may report on these processes to their managers at
the district level [19].
Horizontal arrows illustrate the relationships between
providers and patients and citizens and the associated
external or community accountability processes, where
citizens and patients may express their preferences about
services, and may be involved in monitoring and super-
vising facilities and providers [13]. The functioning of
external accountability processes requires providers to
be responsive to citizen input, including through taking
action to alter services in response to ideas or concerns
raised by citizens [6]. External accountability mecha-
nisms identified in the literature include involvement or
participation of citizens in clinic and district health com-
mittees, the use of patient complaints procedures, pro-
vider report cards and patients’ rights charters [6].
Results
The final set of literature for review included twenty-six
empirical and five review articles [6,14,15,18,20]. These
papers were reviewed for evidence about the functio-
ning of accountability mechanisms in the district health
system and the potential link to patient and citizen
responsiveness. Details of the empirical papers are
provided in Additional file 1. Papers were from Africa
(10 countries), Asia (3 countries, and with one paper
taking a regional perspective), and South America
(4 countries). Many of the empirical papers used a case
study design and the data collected were largely
qualitative in nature. The main methods included obser-
vations, in-depth interviews, focus group discussions,
and reviews of documents and meeting minutes. A
number of papers introduced some form of a control or
comparator through the selection of well performing
and less well performing cases. One paper described a
randomized field experiment [21].
Table 1 summarizes the key types of mechanisms
that were identified within the reviewed empirical pa-
pers. Bureaucratic accountability mechanisms include
1) human resource management processes (including
supervision, disciplinary action, mentoring); and 2)
budgeting, planning and target setting processes. Exter-
nal mechanisms include a range of voice mechanisms
Table 1 Examples of accountability mechanisms and their
functioning
Type of mechanism Example of functioning Link to citizen
responsiveness
Internal accountability
Human resource
management
Regular performance
appraisals between line
managers and staff seek to
evaluate the extent to which
staff are meeting key
performance areas. They also
draw attention to the
necessary competencies,
behaviours and practices of
staff needed to achieve
agreed targets.
Indirect
Budgeting, planning,
priority setting, target
setting
Annual health care plans,
based on an assessment of
local needs, are used to guide
resource allocation processes
to districts and within districts;
budget is allocated and
targets are set; facilities report
back to the district
management on the extent to
which targets have been met.
Indirect
External accountability
Clinic committees A forum for hearing local
needs is provided. Information
is exchanged and citizen or
patient questions or
complaints can be answered.
Information on local needs is
fed into priority setting
processes.
Direct
Provider report cards Patients rate the quality of
care at facilities; information is
provided to citizens about
facility quality of care;
information is provided to
district management teams
about where improvements/
commendations are merited.
Direct
Complaints boxes Patients give input into service
aspects needing improvement.
Staff are sensitised to patient
perspectives.
Direct
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such as 1) clinic and community committee involvement
in the monitoring of providers and the setting of health
care priorities; 2) provider report cards; 3) patient rights
charters; and 4) complaints mechanisms. Some of the em-
pirical papers described and/or evaluated more than one
mechanism, such as the simultaneous use of budgeting
and targeting approaches with human resource manage-
ment approaches, or targeting approaches with external
accountability mechanisms.
In the following sections, we report on key factors that
influence the functioning of these accountability mecha-
nisms. Results are presented first for external accounta-
bility processes, second for human resource management
and external supervision processes and lastly for budgeting
and target setting processes. The results are framed follo-
wing three key themes that have emerged from the review
as influencing functioning: resources (time, space and
capacity), attitudes and perceptions of actors, and the
values, beliefs and culture of the system. Clearly all three
themes overlap and interlink, but we have reported each
separately in order to facilitate understanding. The overlap
is particularly marked in the case of attitudes and per-
ceptions of actors versus values, beliefs and culture of the
system. While system level values and organisational
culture are related to individual beliefs and values, indivi-
dual actors would not always share the values and beliefs
advocated by the system.
External accountability mechanisms
Two review articles [6,20] and several empirical papers
(see Web Appendix 1) described the functioning of ex-
ternal accountability mechanisms. One review paper fo-
cused exclusively on the effectiveness of committees and
the factors that influence their performance. This focus
implied a review of the broader literature on community
participation in committees [20]. By contrast, the second
review article [6] focused on community accountability
(which requires a deeper engagement than some models
of community participation) and reviewed the literature
for evidence of impact and the factors influencing im-
pact for different mechanisms, including committees,
provider report cards, complaints mechanisms, and pa-
tient rights charters.
Resources and capacity
A key theme emerging from the articles related to the
lack of resources allocated to external accountability ini-
tiatives as well as concerns about whether citizens have
the capacity to hold providers to account [6,20,22-24].
Themes related to lack of capacity included the technical
nature of health care [24-26], and lack of clarity in the
roles and responsibilities of clinic committee members
[6,20,27-29]. As observed by Molyneux et al [6], “regard-
ing clarity in role, there remained particular uncertainty,
confusion and sometimes conflict regarding extent of
decision-making power” (p. 9). Articles also suggest
the importance of training for providers and clinic
committee members so that roles can be clarified and
committee members can be empowered to manage
their roles [20,25,26,30].
However, even with role clarity, low education levels
continued to be a barrier [28,31]. In a Kenyan case study,
a district manager suggested that older illiterate com-
mittee members struggled to engage in the committee,
particularly in the area of financial management. This lead
to health workers “usurping” (from a citizen perspective)
the roles of community members. On the other hand,
health workers argued that they had to intervene because
the health service holds them rather than volunteer com-
mittee members accountable for the completion of
accounting records [28]. This finding - pointing to the
potential mismatches between bureaucratic and external
accountability mechanisms - was mirrored in findings that
suggested that committees may be unable to influence the
allocation of budgets to community priorities if national
priorities (as identified in national targets for particular
disease groups and nationally determined expenditure
categories, for example) take precedence over local pro-
cesses [24,26,28,29,32]. In a Tanzanian case study, one
member of the Council Health Management Team (the
district management team that works with clinic com-
mittees to determine district priorities) explained that:
“…the government usually requires us to do the
things it considers important…At times the things
prescribed by the government are not of any
importance to the district. Even so, we include them
in our plans because the government has decided that
they should be carried out” [29] (p. 7).
Attitudes and perceptions of actors
The reviewed literature suggests that external accoun-
tability mechanisms require trusting interpersonal rela-
tionships between providers and citizen representatives.
Where relationships were poor [23,32], community mem-
bers reported feeling scared to raise complaints about
facilities or providers [24,25]. As explained by a patient re-
spondent in a Colombian case study: “ ‘People are used to
being treated badly and to being abused and do nothing
about it.’…They are afraid that health care personnel will
retaliate by providing low quality health care or by
refusing to attend them personally” (p. 56) [24].
From the perspective of providers, resistance to citizen
involvement in health facility monitoring and supervision
was reportedly related to perceptions that community
members were behaving like watchdogs – exercising
control and power without offering support [28,33]. In a
Kenyan case study, the authors concluded that this
Cleary et al. BMC Health Services Research 2013, 13:320 Page 5 of 11
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/13/320
perspective could result in the relatively more powerful
provider seeking to control and dominate the accoun-
tability process [23].
Functioning of external accountability mechanisms
could also be hampered by a perceived history of unful-
filled needs where community members may have low
expectations regarding their health care entitlements
[21,34,35] leading to a perception that holding providers
accountable is a waste of time [22,24,34]. As argued by
Mosquera et al [24], low expectations can be overcome
through a long-term commitment to build positive wor-
king relationships with community members. In their case
study from rural Brazil, Tendler and Freedheim [34] illus-
trated that trust could be built if the health system shows
that it is acting on citizen inputs, including taking appro-
priate disciplinary action against providers that citizens
identified as shirking responsibilities.
Values, beliefs, culture
Several empirical papers [24,25,35,36] and review arti-
cles [6,20] highlighted the potential mis-match between
the values and beliefs of the health system and local
communities relative to the democratic and parti-
cipatory values that underpin external accountability
mechanisms. McCoy et al [20] argue that bureaucratic
health systems may be unwilling to relinquish power to
citizen groups. Similarly, Molyneux et al [6], argue that
the socio-cultural norms and structures that would pro-
mote community participation in accountability mecha-
nisms are not always present. For example, in a Tanzanian
case study, when the district management team was asked
why citizens did not express their opinions about health
service priorities, “the common response was that this was
a new culture and a majority of the public was not aware
of their rights” [29] (p. 10).
Management and supervision
Findings in this section are drawn from two review arti-
cles [15,18], complemented by several empirical papers.
Bosch-Capblanch et al [18] reviewed the literature on
primary health care supervision in developing countries
with a focus on defining the scope of supervision in
policy documents and in practice, and assessing the
evidence for the effects on health service performance.
Dieleman et al [15] reviewed the human resources litera-
ture with the aim of describing how governance issues
have influenced human resource policy development
and identifying strategies that have been used to improve
human resource policy implementation in LMICs.
Resources and capacity
The key theme identified in this section was the connec-
tion between decision-space and management practices.
In many of the study contexts, facility managers, external
supervisors, or clinic committee members would be given
responsibility for managing and monitoring providers
without being given the tools to do the job [19,37,38]. For
example, in The Gambia, findings from a large scale
management strengthening project suggested that while
the project succeeded in improving management skills
and systems within the regional health teams (that were
charged with supervising service delivery within the
decentralized system), their effectiveness was limited by
the policy and practice of central government and donors
including centralized decision-making on issues of staff
establishments and budgets [39].
In settings where managers had limited discretion, two
key managerial practices were identified in the literature.
Managers either took the route of encouraging better
practice through supportive mentoring approaches [19],
or they took the route of discouraging poor practice
through expressing their dissatisfaction through autho-
ritarian approaches (shouting, blaming, criticizing and
micro-managing) [19,38]. This authoritarian style in
turn could be related to the frustration experienced by
managers about their insufficient decision-space and
poor conditions of service [19].
Another argument was that facility managers reproduce
the management styles of their superiors (this theme is
further developed in the section on organisational culture
below). The author of a rich Indian case study [38] sug-
gested that less experienced managers were more likely to
lean upon authoritarian approaches, involving “grilling”
their health workers, instead of offering support and men-
torship. This could be because of their lack of capacity
and experience (managers are often health workers with
no formal managerial training) but also because “working
alongside” and offering support to workers was seen to be
a futile effort by managers who did not have the capacity
to solve many of the problems experienced by their staff.
As explained by George [40], “by enquiring into problems
that require cooperation from powerful actors that are
beyond their control, supervisors only raise false expec-
tations and expose the futility of their roles” (p 213).
Attitudes and perceptions of actors
The relationship between health workers and ma-
nagers was found to be a key factor influencing health
worker motivation and responsive behaviour. Some
health workers described managers as supportive,
motherly, collaborative, and hard working. Such ma-
nagers were seen as role models and inspired their staff
to do their best. On the other hand, there were reports
of unfair treatment by managers or by the system
[19,38,41]. This included unpaid salaries, lack of pro-
motion and/or lack of merit-based promotion, unfair
allocation of privileges (particularly training), lack of
role clarity and being blamed for quality of care or
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other problems that health workers perceived to be
beyond their control.
Beyond unfair treatment was the perception of a lack
of support and care from managers and the health sys-
tem more generally. Health workers who perceived a
lack of care reported that they would be more likely to
take their frustrations out on their patients and in this
manner uncaring attitudes were propagated through the
system from managers to providers to patients [19].
Values, beliefs and culture
Findings in this section suggest that while accountability
processes might be operationalized within interpersonal
relationships, these relationships in turn are governed by
a series of beliefs that operate at the social or organisa-
tional level which structure ways of being and ways of
interacting. A key theme here was the professional iden-
tity of the health worker. Evidence suggests that some
providers enter their professions owing to a sense of
calling - a desire to help those in need [19,37] and that
inspiring health workers around the “mission” of care
could be a powerful motivator [34]. As explained by a
provider in a South African study: “…when I wake up in
the morning I feel the need to go to work inside me, no
one forces me to go to work. Knowing I serve the com-
munity makes me feel good inside” (p. 20). However,
others report frustration in their working conditions and
the system level barriers to doing their job [19,41]. In
the same South African study [19] one provider com-
ments: “For example, with me I just wake up in the
morning with no motivation whatsoever because I know
there is nothing that I will do because we do not have
medicine” (p. 21).
Professional identity was also found to influence the
functioning of external accountability processes where
citizens were given the task of monitoring providers.
Some of the literature suggested that providers felt that
it was beneath their dignity to be monitored by members
of the public [14], and in some settings this was argued
to be demotivating with potentially negative implications
for patient responsiveness [19,41]. On the other hand, if
the system is designed to enhance the status of the pro-
vider then professional identity can be a powerful sup-
port to motivation and potentially to responsive provider
behaviour. This was one finding from a study in Brazil
where the nurse supervisors of community health
workers gained status in the community and felt that
they had more discretion to practice nursing as “a pro-
fessional” because of the greater decision space that had
been delegated [34].
The hierarchical organisational culture that commonly
characterises public systems of health care provision was
another theme [18,19,38]. There was a sense that ma-
nagers engaged in grilling and lecturing their staff
because this was how they were managed by their super-
visors. Similarly, health workers were rude to patients be-
cause of the perceived unfair practices of their managers
[19,38]. In this way, hierarchical attitudes are disseminated
within the health care organisation. Hierarchical manage-
ment styles were also linked to patronage and corruption.
When those in positions of power use this power to serve
individual ends they would be unlikely to implement
systems where management must act as a role model or
be answerable for actions taken [38].
While hierarchical management styles were sometimes
associated with low health worker motivation, a team
based organisational culture and trust in management
was found to be beneficial for motivation [19,42]. In one
Ghanaian study of environmental health officers, good
informal working relationships, a shared understanding
of and commitment to the mission, and a hands-on and
supportive management style were seen to be protective
of motivational levels despite other demotivating factors
[42]. While good relations with communities and pa-
tients are also motivating [42], the authors of a South
African case study of health worker motivation con-
cluded that trust in the manager and trust in colleagues
may be more important [19].
Budgeting and target setting approaches
Very few papers were found that examined in any detail
the functioning of targeting and budgeting accountability
approaches. However, these mechanisms featured in the
external accountability, management and supervision
literature. This allows an examination of how these
bureaucratic mechanisms might intersect and influence
the functioning of the more local level processes of
external accountability and facility management.
Resources and capacity
As suggested in the section on external accountability,
targets, expenditure categories, and budgets that are de-
termined at the county, provincial or national level may
pose a barrier to the functioning of external accountabi-
lity approaches [24,26,28,29,32]. This finding was echoed
in a systematic review in which the authors concluded
that oversight mechanisms encourage accountability of
providers to the state and not necessarily to citizens and
patients [14]. In a case study from The Gambia, these
bureaucratic accountability approaches were also argued
to conflict with delegated managerial practices within
decentralized systems, where planning and budgeting
was still controlled centrally [39].
An Indian case study particularly illustrated how time
consuming accountability processes based on reporting
on targets could be [38]. In speaking of meetings where
targets were discussed one health worker stated: “These
meetings are simply a waste of time…Almost 10 days
Cleary et al. BMC Health Services Research 2013, 13:320 Page 7 of 11
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/13/320
each month goes to these meetings. They should leave
us alone so that we can do our work” (p. 211) [38]. The
functioning of budgeting and target setting approaches
within responsive health systems was also dependent on
the availability of good local data to tailor targets to
local health care needs and on the availability of
adequate training of local officials that were charged
with collecting the target information and of designing
the budget plans [10,25,32].
Attitudes and perceptions of actors
Given the amount of time taken to collect and compile
information for reports, health workers in an Indian case
study reported finding it demotivating if this information
were not used to guide planning or responsiveness. In
addition, workers reported that it was unfair to reduce
the complexity of their working lives to numerical out-
puts, and that the targets themselves might be unfairly
set [38]. According to one provider in this study: “They
are not interested in the work you actually do, only in
the reports you submit” (p. 211) [38]. In a Zambian case
study, budgeting processes were somewhat farcical in
that it was clear that the funds would not be deployed.
“The prevailing perception on budgeting was to think of
budgets to be ‘like a dream, and that not all dreams
come true’” [25].
Values, beliefs and culture
As mentioned, an Indian case study suggested that the
practice of accountability through targets could be per-
ceived by health workers to be unfair and demotivating
[38]. This was not only because of the reductionism
associated with targets, but also because this practice was
perceived to allow the system to pay lip service to the idea
of the provision of patient care, when often the service
functioned to serve other purposes (including corruption
and patronage) [38]. Similarly, in a case study from rural
Nepal, Aitken [43] suggests the need to be cognizant of
what she termed the official versus implicit rationale for
the existence of health care bureaucracies. While on paper
the service was argued to be about the provision of patient
care, in practice the service was seen to exist to pay sala-
ries to workers irrespective of whether any care was
provided. This implicit rationale was understood and
protected by providers and managers although not offi-
cially acknowledged. Accountability mechanisms were
therefore argued by the author to be designed and
implemented such that the main duty of staff was to be
present at their posts; once there it was irrelevant whether
they did any work [43].
Finally, in reflecting on an unsuccessful attempt to
alter budgeting and resource allocation approaches
within a newly decentralized system in Pakistan, Green
and colleagues [10] suggest that while their project
focused on the lack of appropriate budgeting skills as
well as the lack of local information on health needs (i.e.
issues of capacity and resources), insufficient attention
was paid to the decision-making culture. “The culture of
centralized decision-making and an attendant procedu-
rally driven bureaucracy, coupled with the frequent
transfer of staff, means that decentralization both chal-
lenges the organizational and management culture and
is in fact high risk” (p. 1032).
Discussion
In recent years, there has been increased interest in the
potential for accountability mechanisms to improve the
performance of health systems. This paper has undertaken
a review of empirical studies that include an analysis of
the functioning of such mechanisms within public primary
care facilities and districts in low and middle-income
countries. We aimed to unpack the factors that impact on
functioning and have sought to draw a link to respon-
siveness. The literature review identified three sets of
factors influencing functioning: 1) the values, norms, insti-
tutions and culture of health care, versus citizens and
patients; 2) the attitudes and perceptions of providers,
managers, bureaucrats and policymakers versus citizens
and patients; and 3) the resources and capacities of the
health service versus citizens and patients. These themes
have emerged as a result of this review work, and are sum-
marized within Figure 2. The three wheels presented in
the figure suggest the inter-relationships between these
elements – where the values of the system are reflected in
resource flows; resources and capacity impact on attitudes
and perceptions; and attitudes and perceptions impact on
the use of capacity and contribute to enforcing or
changing values. In the figure, the wheel for resources is
depicted as being larger than the other two wheels. This
reflects the idea that adequate resources and capacity is a
necessary but insufficient condition for functioning. Fur-
ther, once resources are adequate, the other wheels would
become more important for functioning and the rela-
tive importance of these factors would differ between
contexts.
The interlinked nature of the wheels captures the idea
that the design of accountability mechanisms needs to
consider the current configurations of resources, atti-
tudes and values within the system as a whole, within
different levels of the system, and how these interface
with each other. Similarly, the design of a new mecha-
nism needs to pay attention to similar elements and in-
terfaces within citizens and patients. For example,
mechanisms that involve citizens in the monitoring of
providers need to take account of whether local citizens
are sufficiently resourced and capacitated to play this
role; whether providers are open to this form of input
from the public or whether they would resist out of a
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perception that community members are behaving like
“watchdogs”; and whether local communities have a
culture of voluntary participation in local activities
such as health care. In addition, even if community
members have been capacitated to hold providers to
account, power differentials between citizens and pro-
viders will continue to pose a barrier to the effective
functioning of external accountability mechanisms.
This implies that particular care should be taken to
ensure that bureaucratic mechanisms are complemen-
tary to health system goals of responsiveness to avoid
the tendency for bureaucratic accountability to crowd
out external accountability and responsiveness to pa-
tients and citizens.
Key questions that might be used to guide those thin-
king about the design of accountability mechanisms are
listed in Figure 2. The literature cannot answer the ques-
tion of which combinations of accountability mechanisms
may work best in which contexts. However, it does suggest
that while resources and capacity are an obvious necessary
condition of functionality, interpersonal relationships and
organisational culture within health care are important to
consider if patient and citizen responsiveness is to be
improved. The link between organisational culture, rela-
tionships and accountability processes is clearly a key con-
sideration in any intervention and context.
Ours is not the first review of accountability processes
in health care. An earlier review by Berlan and Shiffman
[14] focused on health provider accountability to con-
sumers and grouped themes from the literature into
health system factors (such as oversight mechanisms,
revenue source, and nature of competition) and social
factors (consumer power and provider norms). Our
approach which unpacks functioning within different
types of mechanisms (external and bureaucratic) offers
additional insights into what works in different contexts
and for different mechanisms. The other reviews
included in this paper focused on a narrower subset of
the governance and accountability literature including
community participation in clinic committees [20],
community accountability mechanisms [6], governance
approaches in human resource policy design [15] and
the effectiveness of external supervision of health faci-
lities [18]. By including a broader evidence base, we are
able to offer a more comprehensive perspective on the
functioning of different mechanisms in complex health
systems, particularly in terms of the interactions between
the different bureaucratic mechanisms (e.g. budgeting
versus management) and the interactions between bureau-
cratic and external accountability mechanisms. We have
however excluded the growing body of evidence on
performance-based pay, although the existing pay for
performance evidence suggests that our review would
be of interest and of relevance to those debates [44]. In
addition, while our search may not have been broad
enough to identify all of the relevant literature, we
have been able to unpack a range of influences within
three key themes, which could usefully be applied in
future work.
The empirical papers included in this review mainly
adopted a case study design and qualitative data collec-
tion techniques. They therefore offered “thick” descrip-
tions of why different mechanisms may or may not work
within different contexts. In synthesising this literature,
we seek to offer analytic generalisations and to draw out
key lessens for policy development. However, given the
limited amount of evidence regarding bureaucratic me-
chanisms, it is clear that more research is needed about
the functioning of these mechanisms, how they interact
with each other and how they interact with external
accountability mechanisms and promote or hinder pa-
tient and citizen responsiveness. In addition, given the
current evidence it has not been possible to tease out
the impacts on functioning according to whether me-
chanisms aimed to promote accountability as answer-
ability or as enforceability.
Resources
Attitudes
Values
How do the values , beliefs, and culture of system actors interface 
with the accountability mechanism? How does the system and 
accountability mechanism interface with the values and beliefs of 
citizens and patients?
How do the attitudes and perceptions of providers, managers, 
bureaucrats and policymakers interface with the accountability 
mechanism? How does the system and accountability mechanism 
interface with the attitudes and perceptions of citizens and 
patients?
How do resources and capacities in the system interface with the 
accountability mechanism? How does the system and 
accountability mechanism fit with the resources and capacities of 
citizens and patients?
Figure 2 Factors influencing the functioning of accountability mechanisms.
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Conclusion
Accountability mechanisms could be key tools for ensu-
ring the answerability of public primary health care facil-
ities to central bureaucracies through the district health
system, while at the same time providing the local
decision-space that could increase citizen and patient
responsiveness. While evidence is limited, this review
suggests that the design of accountability mechanisms
should pay attention to the attitudes and perceptions of
actors, values of the system and resources, and that dif-
ferent (combinations of ) mechanisms would be needed
for different contexts.
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